


RIGOBERTO ANTONIO MELGAR FUENTES ♦ VITELIO DE JESUS MELGAR ♦ OSCAR ADOLFO MELENDEZ LOPEZ ♦ OSCAR MENDEZ ♦ SABINA DEL CARMEN MENDEZ ♦ CONCEPCION MENDEZ M
OVIDIO MENA ♦ CESAR AUGUSTO MENDEZ ♦ BLANCA ESTELA MEND
MANUEL DE JESUS MENDOZA ♦ MARTIR MENDOZA LOPEZ ♦ SANTOS DANIEL
CANDIDO MENJIVAR ORELLANA ♦ GABRIEL ANTONIO MENJIVAR CORNEJO
MERCEDES ARELI MENJIVAR AGUILAR ♦ JOSE AGRIPINO M
DANIEL ANTONIO MIRA MENDEZ ♦ JESUS MIRA GUEVARA ♦ JU
ADRIAN MIRANDA HERNANDEZ ♦ ALBERTO MIRANDA ♦ CARLO
JULIO MIRANDA HERNANDEZ ♦ PORFIRIO MIRANDA ♦ REINALDO AN
LUIS DEL CARMEN MOJICA ♦ ANGEL CRUZ MOLINA AGUILAR ♦ FRANCO
ROBERTO MOLINA ESTRADA ♦ RAFAEL ULISES MONGE ♦ VICTOR RAUL M
JOSE CARLOS MONTERROSA ♦ JOSE OMAR MONTERROSA ♦ JOSE C
ALBERTINA MORALES ♦ ANTONIO MORALES GALVEZ ♦ FELICIANO MORA
JOSE FELICIANO MORALES GUARDADO ♦ JOSE ISRAEL MORALES CAMPOS
MARIA LEONOR MORALES MORALES ♦ MISAEL MORALES HENRIQUEZ ♦ P
CECILIA DEL CARMEN MORAN LOPEZ ♦ MANUEL DE JESUS MORAN RAMIRE
DOLORES MORENO ORANTES ♦ JORGE ALBERTO MORENO ♦ JOSE
VER RODOLFO MOZON VANEGAS ♦ CARLOS GILBERTO MULATO BELTRAN
FREDO MUÑOZ ♦ JESUS ALFREDO MUÑOZ ♦ MARIA ANA NAVARRO ♦ VI
RUTILIO FRANCISCO NAVAS BARRERA ♦ SANTOS ENRIQUE NAVIDAD PO
MIRA NURIA CORDON ♦ ANA EUGENIA NUÑEZ DE LOPEZ ♦ OSCAR RENE O
GABRIEL ORELLANA ♦ GREGORIO TITO ORELLANA GONZALEZ ♦ GUADALUPE
JUAN ANTONIO ORELLANA BATRES ♦ OSCAR ARMANDO ORELLANA BARIL
DO ERNESTO ORELLANA ♦ JUAN ANTONIO ORTEGA ♦ JUANA F
JOSE FRANCISCO ORTIZ MARTINEZ ♦ MARCO ANTONIO ORTIZ MORENO ♦ SA
GUSTAVO RAMIN HERNANDEZ ♦ ANACLETO OSORIO RODRIGUEZ ♦ JUAN FR
JOSE ANTONIO PALACIO ♦ CARMEN PALACIOS ♦ EFRAIN PALA
WILFREDO ANTONIO PALM MORALES ♦ JEANETTE PARADA SOSA ♦ OSCAR
LUIS ALONSO PASAÑA'S PEREZ ♦ INOCENTE PATRIZ MUZO ♦ ROBERTO PAYES
RAUL ANTONIO PERDOMO MORALES ♦ ALICIA PEREZ ♦ ANGEL PEREZ RIV
FAUSTO ANTONIO PEREZ VAQUEZ ♦ HECTOR ERNESTO PEREZ ♦ JORG
JUAN RAMON PEREZ LANDAVERDE ♦ LUIS ALONSO PEREZ ASCEN
MIGUEL ANGEL PEREZ HERNANDEZ ♦ OVIDIO JACINTO PEREZ ♦ PEDRO PEREZ
CRUZ ENRIQUE PEÑA GOMEZ ♦ MANUEL PEÑA BONILLA ♦ MANUE
GUADALUPE MERECI PICHE RAMÍROS ♦ ANTONIO PINEDA ♦ DAVID A. PINEDA S
PEDRO ANGEL PINELA OSTORGA ♦ RICARDO MIGUEL PINEDA
JOSE ROBERTO PONCE VELASQUEZ ♦ ANA GLADYS PORTILLO GUERRA ♦ CARLO
JOSE ROBERTO PORTILLO MANZANO ♦ JUAN FRANCISCO PORTILLO ROSALB
MARINA PRESA ♦ FRANCISCO ARTURO QUEZADA ♦ NELSON ERNESTO QUEZAD





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Archbishop Rivera y Damas



Ambassador Deane Hinton



Secretary of State Haig



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CONFIDENTIAL SAN SALVADOR 8588

EXDIS

E. O. 12065: RDS-1 11/10/01 (HINTON, DEANE R.) OR-M
TAGS: PINS PINT SHUM ES
SUBJECT: SALVADORAN ARMY TACTICS

REF: SAN SALVADOR 8518

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. BISHOP RIVERA Y DAMAS, DURING LUNCH AT NUNCIATURA NOVEMBER 9, TOLD NUNCIO, FONMIN AND ME OF HIS CONCERN ABOUT BRUTAL ARMY TACTICS DURING RECENT OPERATION IN URULUTAN. IN RESPONSE TO MY FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS, RIVERA Y DAMAS SAID THERE IS NO QUESTION IN HIS MIND ABOUT WHAT HAD HAPPENED. DURING HIS LAST VISIT TO HIS PARISH IN SANTIAGO DE MARIA HE HAD HEARD FIRST-HAND ACCOUNTS FROM PARISH PRIESTS WHO HAD HEARD MANY STORIES FROM SURVIVORS. THE BISHOP SAID THE AREA BETWEEN SAN AUGUSTIN AND BERLIN AND WEST TO RIO LEMPA HAS BEEN TOTALLY UNDER INSURGENT CONTROL FOR SOME CONSIDERABLE TIME. HE THOUGHT THERE WERE PERHAPS AS MANY AS 10 OR 12 FORTIFIED GUERRILLA CAMPS IN THIS AREA, EACH OF WHICH WAS BASE FOR PERHAPS 40 TO 70 ARMED MEN. THE FPL, ERP AND PRIC (CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMUNIST PARTY) ALL HAD FORCES IN THE AREA. THE ARMY, IN ATTACKING, HAD SUFFERED CONSIDERABLE LOSSES WITHOUT MUCH SUCCESS AGAINST HEAVILY ARMED GUERRILLAS ALTHOUGH THERE WAS WIDESPREAD KILLING OF CAMP FOLLOWERS--WOMEN
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PAGE 02 SAN SA 08588 101920Z


AND CHILDREN. HE IS NOT CERTAIN BUT HE ATTRIBUTES THIS MORE TO TROOP FRUSTRATION THAN TO COMMAND DECISION. HE BELIEVES THAT THERE WERE AT LEAST 200 CIVILIAN NON-COMBATANTS KILLED BUT HE RECOGNIZES THAT THEY WERE PART OF OR RELATED TO THE GUERRILLA FORCE SUPPORT NETWORKS.

REVIEW AUTHORITY:
Alan Flanigan, Senior
Reviewer

3. HE TOLD US HE ENCOUNTERED SOME SOLDIERS RETURNING TO THE CUARTELS AFTER THE OPERATION, ASKED WHAT HAD HAPPENED AND WAS TOLD, "HEMOS LIMPIADO LA ZONA." (WE CLEANED UP THE AREA). THE BISHOP SAID HE FEARED THAT THAT WAS LITERALLY CORRECT.



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APPROVED FOR RELEASE
12-Mar-2014

Director of
Central
Intelligence

Top Secret

NOFORN
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(b)(3) NatSec

National Intelligence Daily
(Cable)

2 September 1982



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UW v. CIA

With only about 12 helicopters operational at one time, commanders have not been able to airlift large numbers of ground troops on a regular basis. Colonel Bustillo explained to a US Congressional delegation last September that priority missions such as combat resupply leave few helicopters available for troop transport. Because of this, forces have on many occasions lost the element of tactical surprise, failed to cut off retreating insurgent units, and had to pull troops back from threatened forward positions because they could not be reinforced in time. The Arce Battalion took 48 hours to get troops into position for an operation in Morazan in November 1983, for example, giving enemy forces time to slip away. In December, after the leadership reshuffle, we began to see troop transport receive higher priority—eight UH-1H helicopters lifted troops into action near Cahabaque—but the small number of helicopters available still precludes regular airlift operations.

Despite continuing resource shortages, several outstanding Salvadoran commanders have proved tough and resourceful, according to our analysis, providing models of how the war should be fought. In 1982, Lieutenant Colonel Ochoa in Cabanas was already sending out 11-man patrols at night and combining his military actions with a strong community relations program. In a major operation in Morazan in early 1983, Colonel Flores tried encirclement tactics, leaving some forces behind to secure gains after the primary attack was accomplished instead of large sweeps toward a static blocking force. Lieutenant Colonel Cruz periodically sends companies north of the Torola River in Morazan to flush out insurgent units, then pulls his troops back, and calls in pre-planned airstrikes.

A long-range reconnaissance company—divided into 18 six-man teams—received intensive US training in Panama and has undertaken dangerous but productive missions into enemy-controlled territory, pinpointing targets for subsequent air, artillery, and ground force strikes.

Reconnaissance units discovered and destroyed an insurgent camp at the mouth of the Lempa River in April 1984. Salvadoran observer aircraft have increased the Army's visual reconnaissance capability.

The armed forces' ability to use intelligence has not kept pace with collection, however. Poor communications between the General Staff and field commands have proved a major liability in the dissemination of strategic and tactical information. Despite the possibility of undermining the General Staff, US personnel have on occasion felt compelled to deliver data directly to field commanders when staff bottlenecks have prevented operational intelligence from getting to the field.

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DATE: 03-Mar-2016

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(C-11)

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Intelligence

A Salvadoran intelligence service was set up in early 1982, and tactical intelligence courses have better prepared officers and senior enlisted personnel for intelligence staff positions at all levels in the armed forces. By the end of 1983, almost all brigades and major battalions had full-time intelligence chiefs, in contrast to only part-time positions at this level at the end of 1981. With US urging, Army units have paid more attention to the capture and

interrogation of guerrillas

A long-range reconnaissance company—divided into 18 six-man teams—received intensive US training in Panama and has undertaken dangerous but productive missions into enemy-controlled territory, pinpointing targets for subsequent air, artillery, and ground force strikes, the US defense attaché reports. Reconnaissance units discovered and destroyed an insurgent camp at the mouth of the Lempa River in April 1984. Salvadoran observer aircraft have increased the Army's visual reconnaissance capability.

The armed forces' ability to use intelligence has not kept pace with collection, however. Poor communications between the General Staff and field commands have proved a major liability in the dissemination of strategic and tactical information. Despite the possibility of undermining the General Staff, US personnel have on occasion felt compelled to deliver data directly to field commanders when staff bottlenecks have prevented operational intelligence from getting to the field.

Most of the time-sensitive technical intelligence comes in at night when Salvadoran staff and troops have not been able to respond. All-source tactical operational planning packages from Washington originally were not timely; they took several weeks to prepare, needed updating in the country, and were too complicated for local commanders to use.

Modifications in the packages are improving their usefulness for Salvadoran operations. Independent local commanders and pilots in some cases have been overconfident about their abilities and have failed to heed intelligence produced at the national level. Although commanders are paying increasing attention to their immediate areas,

channels still do not function smoothly for the transmission of local information to the High Command for analysis and dissemination elsewhere in the country.

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2016 DECLASSIFICATION

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Thank you



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